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This paper assesses the existence of both greater proﬁtability for large-scale farms and economies of scale in the French viticulture sector,
thereby conﬁrming or invalidating the argument put forward by the European Commission to justify the abolition of vine planting rights.
According to this argument (1) economic efﬁciency increases with the extension of the vine area in vineyards, and (2) vine planting rights prevent
the expansion of farms.
This article discusses the issue of economies of scale in agriculture and focuses on speciﬁc matters related to viticulture. The key issue of our
demonstration lies in the impossibility of deﬁning economies of scale by comparing the proﬁts of farms producing different types of product at
different prices. By using an assessment of these variables through FADN, it proposes and justiﬁes the interest of using a measurement of output
which is the net value added per unit of labor.
The report prepared on behalf of the European Parliament is criticized as it demonstrates a positive correlation between size and efﬁciency,
without taking account of the broad farm gate price dispersion for wine. This article demonstrates that in the case of France, over the period
2005–2007, farm size has little impact on performance. The signiﬁcant differences observed are the result of differences in the selling price
of wine.
In summary, the main argument put forward by the European Commission to justify canceling vine planting rights is not adapted to the case of
France because it considers wine as a single product sold at a single price.
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The European Commission is pursuing the goal of reform-
ing the Common Agricultural Policy through the adaptation of
agriculture and farmers to market signs: the regulations are
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.inra.fr (A. Coelho).towards new efﬁciency goals on the one hand and sustain-
ability on the other (European Commission, 2008). Efforts
aimed at increasing efﬁciency are accompanied by the hope
that an improvement in the economic performances of produ-
cers will be based on increased farm size as this provides an
opportunity to exploit economies of scale. According to some
authors, such economies of scale can be achieved in agriculture
just as in other industries (Nooteboom, 2006), even if some
researchers have long contested their existence (Boussard,
1973).
The last CMO for wine, introduced in 2008, established new
legislation ensuring the deﬁnitive suppression of vine planting
rights. The main justiﬁcation for this decision was based on the
negative impact of the previous legislation on the productionlsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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New World wine producers (Montaigne and Coelho, 2006):
according to the European Commissioner, M. Dacian Ciolos,
“… this analysis demonstrated that vine planting rights lead to
an increase in the cost of production and are a barrier to the
rationalization of farm holdings, thus decreasing competitive-
ness”.1 In the months following this reform, many heated
debates were held (Vautrin, 2010; Montaigne et al., 2012)
concerning the existence of economies of scale in the
viticulture sector and the commission wrote a draft contain-
ing new rules for managing production potential through vine
planting rights. The current status of the European legislation
concerning permission to plant vines is going to change,
transforming the planting right regime in a regime based on
authorizations (reg. 1308/2013. chapter III).
In the viticulture sector, increased farm size may be the
result of two mechanisms: ﬁrst, the promotion of economic
concentration, when the total volume of production is
unchangeable, through the elimination of small-scale produ-
cers. Such a phenomenon has been observed in many other
agricultural segments (Kroll, 1987). While this mechanism
worked well in viticulture, some researchers considered it
insufﬁcient. The suppression of vine planting rights will have
no impact on this speed of change, at least in those zones
where farm holdings are highly specialized in viticulture,
because the mechanism depends on the life-cycle of farms
and of the individual choices between sale of the land and
grubbing-up of vines.
Second, the result may be achieved through the growth of
certain farm holdings by planting new vines resulting in an
increase in the total surface area of the vineyard. We can
therefore raise two questions: ﬁrst, what would be the
consequences of increased production on the market in terms
of prices and farmers' revenues? while this is an important
question, it exceeds the scope of this paper. Second, would
large-scale farms, either newly created or recently expanded,
be more efﬁcient than the smaller ones?.
Our article focuses on the ﬁnal issue. We intend to
determine the existence and extent of economies of scale in
the viticulture segment as well as the direct link between the
size of farm holdings and their proﬁtability. At present, as a
study at European level seems unfeasible due to access
constraints to European agricultural data, we will focus here
only on the case of France.
In the ﬁrst section we explain how the paper contributes to
the existing literature research about vine planting rights in
EU.
In the second section, we will address measurement issues
relating to economies of scale in agriculture, and more
particularly viticulture. Here, we will introduce an index to
identify their existence and extent.
We will then study the variations in this index, illustrating
the need to take account of the signiﬁcant differences in the
price of wine.1E-9290/10DE: answer provided by Mr. Cioloş on behalf of the commission
(22.12.2010).In the fourth section, we will demonstrate that for each class
of prices in the French viticulture sector, variations in proﬁt-
ability as a function of vine surface area do not exist or are
simply erratic. Whatever the case, these variations are too
weak to increase the capacity of large-scale farm holdings to
achieve acceptable revenues and small-scale farm holdings do
not reach such revenues.
In the ﬁnal section of this article, in order to extend our
discussion beyond the French case, we will demonstrate that
the legislation relating to vine planting rights in the European
Union did not prevent the increase in the average size of farm
holdings over the past 17 years.
2. Literature research about vine planting rights
Economic research literature on planting rights is limited.
If we consider it extensively, we ﬁnd parliamentary reports
summarizing expert opinions, taking stock of the legal texts
and providing some statistics on land which is not planted in
vines in the appellation areas (Vautrin, 2010; Suguenot and
Got, 2011). These reports, although expressing clear and fully
detailed diagnostic, give no scientiﬁc demonstration, even if
the stakes are clearly laid. In particular, they argue that (1)
signiﬁcant non-planted areas are available at European level
(1.2 million hectares of 1.67 in delimited PDO areas); (2) the
planting rights are neither an obstacle to the development of
the wine industry, nor a barrier to entry for investors; (3) they
provide regulation in the economy without budgetary cost.
They also expressed fears of the professionals: (1) an increase
in production, (2) relocation of vineyards in particular for the
production of wines without geographical indication, (3) the
usurpation and abuse of the protected denomination of origin
(PDO) reputation by plantations nearby these areas, (4) the
industrialization of wine-making and a concomitant decrease
in quality. We could add the work of political science focusing
on political action and lobbying to challenge the decision of
the signing of the new CMO wine in 2008 (Blancaneux, 2014).
The pioneering work of Luigi Galletto, analyzed the
planting rights market in a PDO region from two surveys
(2004 and 2008). The author has characterized the size of
transfers, the role of brokers, delays, zoning restrictions, the
size and age of the growers, the quality of wine (PDO), the
share of intra and extra-regional transfers, the impact of
limiting the transfer price of planting rights, their high
variability and the main factors of increasing or decreasing
of these prices (Galletto, 2010).
The applied study of Roberta Sardone's team is the most
ambitious and most important. In its theoretical part, the study
uses the Nerlove's model (Sardone, 2012). This model tests the
response, in terms of area planted with vines by producers, to
the price indicator to verify the ability of this mechanism to
achieve market equilibrium. The introduction highlights the
difﬁculties encountered in seeking to support relevance of
these reactions mainly due to the existence of agricultural
policies, market uncertainty, low elasticities of supply and
demand, price volatility and income. The price indicator is the
average export price. This model is applied at a high level of
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a highly differentiated qualitatively production, therefore
in price.
In its applied part, the study frequently uses the concept of
economies of scale but in two different meanings: sometime,
they apply the notion to large companies and the ‘downstream’
industry. In that case the deﬁnition is related to economies of
scope and economies of organization: large size, ability to
provide services in different conditions, marketing, interna-
tional market access, etc. On the other hand, this concept is
more typically applied to the size of the vineyards. These
double meanings can induce misunderstanding in analyzing
the phenomenon.
Deconinck and Swinnen (2014), propose a theoretical model
assessing the effect of planting rights on areas planted with
vine based on market supply and price of land. This is a classic
application of surplus accounts (Welfare effects) to evaluate
the economic policy consequences on who are the beneﬁciaries
and the losers (Bourdon, 1982).
“Our theoretical model integrates the markets for wine, land
and planting rights. We identify the efﬁciency and distribu-
tional consequences of planting rights and we show how
differences between Member States in implementation of
planting rights, in particular concerning trade and enforcement
of planting rights and the functioning of the reserve system,
affect efﬁciency and welfare.” (Deconinck and Swinnen, 2014,
p. 18).
The advantage of this model is to be based on the
microeconomics of production. But like any model of this
type, we can discuss the assumptions, the assessment of key
variables and the lack of application demonstrating its rele-
vance. The important point is price differentiation. The authors
have difﬁculties to deal with differentiated products and
different levels of price, by offering as much land markets
(thus models) as there are price levels and quality of wines.
“That is, we assume that producers within one region are
producing a homogenous product. In reality, of course, the
quality and price of wines can vary a lot between different
producers. This could be incorporated in the model by
assuming that ‘high quality’ producers and ‘low quality’
producers form two separate regions (with or without trade
in planting rights between regions, as analyzed later).”
(Deconinck and Swinnen, 2014, p. 6).
In that case it should be difﬁcult to aggregate the results for
the whole region and every price segment.
3. The size of farm holdings: an economic issue
“Economies of scale may be deﬁned initially as those that
result when the increased size of a single operating unit
producing or distributing a single product reduces the unit
cost of production or distribution” (Chandler and Hikino,
1994).2
Economies of scale result from the existence of ﬁxed costs
or, in other words, the indivisibility of certain production2Here highlighted by the authors.factors, as well as from learning economies (improved skills)
and economies relating to the cost of inputs in relation to
changing production techniques (Vettori, 2003).
3.1. Economies of scale in agriculture.
In agriculture, economies of scale are most often linked with
mechanization which allows the use of more powerful and
high-performance machines. However, the existence of econo-
mies of scale in agriculture has been always at the heart of
agricultural studies. Some authors have contested their very
existence or the extent to which they can be achieved in
agriculture (Boussard, 1973, 1987; Marshall et al., 1997;
Gleyses, 2007; and initially Marshall, 1890) “In agriculture
and other trades in which a man gains no very great new
economies by increasing the scale of his production, it often
happens that a business remains of about the same size for
many years, if not for many generations”. (Marshall, 1890, p.
238). Others, without systematically questioning their exis-
tence, note their limited importance (Chavas, 2001).
With regard to the debate on the existence and extent of
economies of scale, two recent studies in the dairy industry
provide ambiguous conclusions: the ﬁrst (Institut de l’Elevage,
2011) shows economies of scale ranging from €10 to 19 per
thousand liters of milk, depending on the type of production
system, for an estimated average cost of approximately €500.
If we exclude the cost of labor, these economies of scale
exist for a volume of between 200 and 700 thousand liters of
milk produced every year. Above this level of production,
economies of scale do not exist. The main result shows that
individual costs vary considerably from one farm to another,
independent of the size of the farm, a fact which can lead to
very signiﬁcant variations in the revenues of family labor.
A second study in the same industry in Canada (Perrier,
2011) reaches similar conclusions: small economies of scale
are achieved for between 45 and 120 cows while economies of
scale stabilize for larger farms. The author ﬁnds a lack of
economies of scale if labor constraints are taken into account
together with scattered proﬁts: small farm holdings may be
considerably more proﬁtable than larger farms.
In the agricultural sector, the question of economies of scale is
currently being reviewed, namely by taking account of environ-
mental considerations and by establishing a link between econo-
mies of scale and economies of scope and learning. The French
study of the dairy industry therefore compares the proﬁts of
specialized barns with those of farm holdings engaged on
polyculture and cow breeding and suggests that self-supply
(consumption of its own grain, pastureland and fodder) and the
valorization of by-products (manure) balances any economies of
scale achieved in specialized farms.
These studies therefore draw our attention to the speciﬁcity
of the results according to the nature of the products, which
can either be associated with the land (grass, grain) or removed
from the land (milk). Furthermore, in all cases, these products
or crops are essentially commodities with a single market price.
The studies also highlight the sensitivity of the outcomes to the
estimated remuneration of labor on farms. Thus, the decision
3Typical farm "quality wine " is a farm whose more than 2/3 of the total
Standard Gross Margin comes from grape vines producing appellation wines
(former categories AOC and VDQS in France and VQPRD in European
Union). Typical farm " wine other than quality” is a wine estate whose more
than 2/3 of the total SGM comes from vineyards as a whole (including table
grapes) without the SGM appellation vineyards reaches alone this threshold of
2/3. These categories changed in the new regulation as PDOThe terms and
refer to a no longer existing classiﬁcation as the category v.q.p.r.d. was not
conﬁrmed by the reg. 498/2008 and later by the current reg. 1308/2013.
4There is no case here of economies of scope as we rank each vineyard
according to the average price and quantity of an undifferentiated product.
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can considerably alter the outcomes.
The only study we found on viticulture and return to scale,
thanks to the referees, was realized by Townsend et al. (1998).
The study was performed using farm management data from
wine farms of the Western Cape. All farmers are members of
co-operative wine cellars implying very few, if any, scale
economies in processing and marketing. Their method is based
on data envelopment analysis. “The results suggest that
approximately 50% of wine grape producers in the Western
Cape experience constant return to scale (CRS) with approxi-
mately 10% and 40% having increasing and decreasing return
to scale, respectively.” p. 178. Unfortunately they provide no
information on different levels of wine prices.
Vita and D'Amico (2013) compare the economic results of
micro and small size quality wine grape farms in Sicily.
Average farm proﬁtability expressed as farm net value for each
homogeneous area was calculated taking into account produc-
tion costs and total output.
The study reveals how designation of origin does not always
ensure adequate proﬁtability for micro and small vine growers.
But in that study, wine-growers sale unprocessed grapes that
do not provide any value-added products and local producers
do not gain additional remuneration for the intangible compo-
nents of their PDO grapes. The study does not explore to what
extent these results are caused by increasing costs or by an
inefﬁcient market structure. The level of prices is not analyzed.
In short our contribution focuses on the assessment of
the question of economies of scale in the French viticulture
taking into account the wide diversity of the wine prices at the
farm level.
3.2. Economies of scale in viticulture
It would appear important to examine wine production as
previous studies show that the desire for economies of scale
seems to be the main justiﬁcation for changes to the legislation
concerning the suppression of vine planting rights. Likewise,
this question was also addressed in the goals of the study
commissioned by the European Parliament: “The expected advan-
tages of liberalization are related to cost and supply ﬂexibility. It is
expected that a cost reduction may be achieved by eliminating the
direct and indirect costs of requesting and acquiring planting rights
and possibly the economies of scale linked to more suitable sizes
of vineyards” (Sardone, 2012, p. 26).
Economies of scale are deﬁned as the decrease in the average
cost of production of ONE product when the quantities (or
volumes) of that product increase.
Like most of the European viticulture segments, French
viticulture is characterized by a supply of wines demonstrat-
ing varying levels of quality, with very different reputations
and related to a wide range of Protected Designation of Origin
(PDO) or Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) labels.
Differences among wines go beyond the distinction between
‘Quality wine’ and ‘Wine other than quality’. This distinction
classiﬁes farms according to the type of farming in the surveys
and namely the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN), adistinction adopted in the report commissioned by the Eur-
opean Parliament.3 Furthermore, these wines are generally
produced in diverse geographical areas deﬁned by law, often
with heterogeneous yield constraints. Finally, wines are sold at
very different prices The price level of wine can range from 1
to 20 and more.
It is therefore clear that the ‘wine’ category does not satisfy
the condition of uniqueness of the product necessary to the
pursuit of potential economies of scale; the same applies to the
two categories of ‘Quality wines’ and ‘Wine other than
quality’. This situation is quite speciﬁc to viticulture because
most agricultural crops are commodities with a standard
quality whose price is unique and deﬁned by the market (the
exceptions, such as the case of milk used in the production of
PDO cheese, are relatively rare and concern low volumes or
quantities).
Concerning our problem statement, and considering the
difﬁculty encountered in applying this rationale to each of
the 350 French designations of origin, we will adopt a
differentiation for the farm holdings according to the
average selling price of the wine as a proxy for homogenous
categories of wine.
Our insistence on the heterogeneity of the price of wine is
not intended to highlight the existence of differences in
revenues based on the price (which would be a quite trivial
matter). It endeavors to show the need to take these differences
into account when assessing economies of scale and, more
generally, the size effect on proﬁtability. From a methodo-
logical point of view, it seems impossible to compare the
production costs of two farms producing different wines, i.e.
different products.4 The concept of economies of scale can
be applied to a single product or to similar products from
both farms.
Accordingly, if this precaution were not taken, an evaluation
of the size effect on costs or on proﬁtability would not make
sense. We will now deﬁne the relationship between economies
of scale and proﬁtability.4. Materials and methods
The main difﬁculty in measuring costs in agriculture (the
same applies to viticulture) lies in the estimation and measure-
ment of labor costs. Indeed, for the vast majority of farm
holdings, the work of the leading farmer (or owner) and
possibly of other members of his family accounts for the
largest proportion, and often all, of the labor used in
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least not taking into account a relatively ﬁxed rate from one
farm holding to another: it is the proﬁt of the farm holding that
is used as a means to compensate family labor.
Consequently, one cannot speak of measuring the produc-
tion costs related to labor involvement. We do not, therefore,
include labor in the appraisal of production costs. However, in
order not to ignore the importance of this production factor, we
sought to establish an economic indicator of differences
between farm holdings that takes account of labor productivity
but does not involve cost. The ‘net value added per worker’
(i.e. awu – average work unit) calculated on the basis of the
FADN data satisﬁes this condition. However, we must also
demonstrate that the variations in this indicator are good proof
of the existence or absence of economies of scale and their
potential magnitude.
Let us consider the following variables:5
pronVA: net value added.
P: wine selling price.
Q: wine production (volume).
S: surface area of vineyard.
Y: yield (wine volume per vineyard unit).
L: labor quantity.
C: production costs (without labor)¼ intermediate
consumptionþdepreciation.By deﬁnition, for a farm producing wine and only one type
of wine:
nVA¼ ðPnQÞC





therefore : nVA=L¼ P– C=Q  3nQ=L
so : nVA=L¼ P– C=Q  3n S=L 3nY ð1Þ
In other words, the net value added per worker (nVA/L) is
equal to the difference between the selling price and the cost
(excluding labor) per unit of production (C/Q), multiplied by
the yield and the physical productivity of labor (S/L, i.e. the
surface area per worker).
Let us now focus on the variations of net value added per
worker in light of changes to the unit cost and physical labor
productivity. Together, these elements form the basis for
assessing economies of scale if their signiﬁcance decreases
when the size (of the vineyard) increases.
We have already stated the need to make assumptions for a
given class of selling prices; therefore P is a constant that does
not depend on the surface area. The same rationale applies to
yields since within the same designation of origin, yields (like
prices) are equal or similar.5
From the point of view of the existence of economies of
scale, 4 cases – and only 4 – can arise:In French viticulture, there is a notable exception to this rule (for the
duction of Cognac) which we will address later on.H1. unit costs (excluding labor) decrease and physical labor
productivity remains unchanged. According to Eq. (1) above,
it is clear that our economic indicator (net value added per
worker) increases.
H2. unit costs remain unchanged and physical productivity of
labor increases: our economic indicator increases.
H3. unit costs decrease and physical productivity of labor
increases: our economic indicator increases.
H4. unit costs increase and physical productivity of labor also
increases (We can relate to this situation a case where the unit
costs decrease while physical labor productivity also decreases
although it is a very unlikely event). In this case, reasoning
according to production costs alone cannot lead to a decision
being taken because the unit price of family labor is unknown
by nature and we cannot, therefore, ﬁnd a balance for these
opposite variations. In other words, nothing allows us in this
situation to say whether or not economies of scale exist.
However, reviewing our indicator (net value added per worker)
can help us to make a decision. For example, if the indicator
increases at the same time as the size of the vineyard, this can
favor the development of economies of scale.
In short, at a given price (and performance) level, the net
value added per unit of labor changes to the same extent as the
average unit cost, although in opposite directions thus
making it a very good indicator of whether or not economies
of scale exist. It should also be noted that the study for the
European Parliament (Sardone, 2012) adopted exactly the
same indicator.
Finally, and most importantly, this indicator (net value
added per worker) allows us to measure the effectiveness of
economies of scale (when they exist) in substantially improv-
ing incomes in large farm holdings, for example by helping
them to meet or exceed the minimum socially accepted
income. Indeed, the net value added per worker is primarily
used to pay family labor (and possibly the salaries of non-
family workers). Other uses (payment of interests on loans and
land leases per worker) are much smaller and we have no
reason to believe they vary a priori with the size of the
vineyard since they primarily depend on the ﬁnancial situation
of the farm owner and not on the business operations of the
farm holding.
This indicator therefore shows whether it is possible to
improve unit labor remuneration in viticulture by increasing
farm size. These possible improvements in remuneration result
from economies of scale, i.e. a lower unit cost excluding labor
and / or improved physical labor productivity, all for a given
(non-variable) level of wine selling prices.
Differences in net value added per worker between large and
small farms are a good indicator of the adequacy of the EU
policy aimed at fostering the growth of farms by eliminating
vine planting rights with regard to its goal of improving farm
performances and thus obviating the policy of supporting
viticulture.
We can now discuss the economic effects of abolishing
planting rights.
Graph 1. Farm net value added per average work unit per category of vineyard (k€/awu) - Aquitaine and Languedoc-Roussillon (period 2006–2009).
Source: Sardone et al., 2012 – p.77, ﬁgure 3.9 (Data source: EU-FADN – DG AGRI)
B. Delord et al. / Wine Economics and Policy 4 (2015) 22–34 275. Limitations of studies neglecting price heterogeneity
In 2011, a report prepared on behalf of the European
Parliament (Sardone, 2012) addressed wine-growing issues.
This report focused on the debate concerning the abolition of
vine planting rights.5.1. Merging data from two Structurally different regions
One argument developed in this study established a relation-
ship between the proﬁtability (as measured through the Net
Value Added per unit of labor) of the farm holdings and the
different sizes of the farms6. The data considered was provided
by FADN for the period 2006–2009. With regard to France,
only two regions were considered: Aquitaine and Languedoc-
Roussillon (Graph 1). The study distinguishes between farms
belonging to the different ‘types of farming’ (TF): ‘grape
growing with designation of origin’ and ‘other grape growing’.
This study highlights a strong trend towards increased
proﬁtability when the surface area of the vineyard increases.
This is true for the case of the ‘other grape growing’ TF and
for the ‘grape growing with designation of origin’ TF, despite
a slightly reduced signiﬁcance for the latter.5.2. Some comments about this study explaining the distortion
It should be noted that considering two regions together may
inﬂuence the results. This is not of consequence for the ‘grape
growing other than quality’ TF, only available in Languedoc-
Roussillon, but for the ‘grape growing with designation of6
“Currently, the existing economies of scale in viticulture (see §3.2.1;
Cembalo et al., 2010) largely dependent on mechanization (Pomarici et al.,
2006; Galletto and Barisan, 2007), may, in the event of liberalization,
determine a pressure towards expanding vineyards. Such a phenomenon would
accentuate the split between capital intensive processes based on large
vineyards which may become larger, and small labor-intensive farms. In such
a situation, the competitive pressure of larger farms on the smaller units may,
in principle, determine the marginalization of the latter. Indeed, with the
abolition of planting rights, small labor-intensive processes are exposed to the
risks of shrinking.” (Sardone et al., 2012, p. 89–90).origin’ TF where 1/3 of the areas are located in Languedoc-
Roussillon and 2/3 are situated in Aquitaine. These two
regions are characterized by designations of different origin
and therefore by different price levels. This explains why
proﬁtability in Languedoc is clearly lower than in Aquitaine.
This situation, combined with the presence of larger farms in
Languedoc, may affect the interpretations of the observations.
One should also notice the distinction between the inﬂu-
ences of the two TFs (‘Quality wine’ and ‘Wine other than
quality’) in distinguishing wine selling price levels. However,
this distinction is not sufﬁcient. In Languedoc-Roussillon, in
the case of the ‘wines with designation of origin’ TF, the
coefﬁcient of variation (among the farms) of the selling price is
approximately 0.60, which is relatively signiﬁcant. Moreover,
several direct relationships exist between farm size and selling
price. For example, for a surface area of vines of more than
50 ha, the average price is around €75/hl in contrast to a price
of less than €40/hl for farm sizes between 10 and 15 ha.
Establishing a link solely between proﬁtability and the size of
the vineyards is relatively restrictive, even if our reasoning
goes from one type of farming (TF) to another.
Another interesting point highlighted in this study is that,
considering the two regions globally or individually for
whatever TF considered, independent of the size category
retained, proﬁtability never reaches a high level; in all situations
the values are below the average proﬁtability of French agricul-
tural farms (i.e. approximately €31,000 per unit of labor, period
2005–2007).
Accordingly, if the study quoted above were to take into
account other winegrowing regions in France and include
differences in the wine selling prices, the results and conclu-
sions would be considerably different.
The selling price of the wine varies considerably from one
farm to another. These variations are mainly related to the
different designations of origin (Delord, 2011). Even limiting
the boundaries of our analysis to the regional level, the
differences are signiﬁcant (see Table 1).
Let us now identify some possible variations in proﬁtability
for homogeneous groups of wine according to the size of farms
in the French viticulture segment.
Table 1
Distribution of farms represented according to the selling price of the wine and the location. .
Source: FADN-France, constant sample 2005–2007– authors' computation
wine price (€/hl) Regions or areas Total France
Champagne Loire valley Burgundy Alsace Poitou-Char. Aquit.þMidiP Rhône-Alpes Langue-doc-R. Prov.þCorsica
none sale 0 5 37 745 488 77 91 0 11 1454
40–75 0 567 0 0 1859 695 546 8164 1331 13,382
75–200 0 1219 388 122 326 1496 1078 1491 1603 9949
200–500 171 505 1544 548 0 1,386 1212 588 822 7536
500–1,000 2785 65 740 687 0 316 316 0 259 6048
4¼1,000 3649 0 250 0 0 47 47 0 5 4029
Total 6605 2361 2959 2102 2673 4029 3288 10,243 4032 42,398
yield (q/ha) 131 68 76 96 131 63 66 74 60 76
Graph 2. – Proﬁtability by wine price classes and increasing size of the quartiles of vineyard.
Source: FADN-France, constant sample 2005–2007– authors' computation
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Because of the difﬁculty encountered in accessing FADN
databases for all European countries, we decided to limit our
analysis to the case of France. We consider a constant sample
for the period from 2005 to 2007: As in fact the FADN survey
renews partially the sample each year, we took into account
only the 797 typical farms, specialized in viticulture and
interviewed each year during the three years period. That
sample is representing 42,000 wine-farms. We extrapolated
the sample to the whole population of wine-farms in a
representative way, using variables as region, typical farm TF,
Standard gross margin (SGMs) classes, etc.
6.1. Differentiation according to wine selling prices
We have already emphasized the need to take account of
regional differences in wine production (beyond the traditional
distinction between viticulture ‘with’ or ‘without’ designation
of origin) and differences in the price ranges for those wines.
We will satisfy this obligation by identifying ﬁve price levels.
Moreover, considering that the distribution of French farms(viticulture) according to their surface area varies considerably
from one price range to another, we chose not to deﬁne
categories of surface area with ﬁxed boundaries but to use a
distribution in percentiles, in this case quartiles (the boundaries
are provided in the Appendix B).
Among the grape farms with a high average selling price
(i.e. greater than €500/hl), i.e. accounting for 24% of French
specialized grape farms, surface area is not a signiﬁcant factor
in explaining the variation in the proﬁtability of labor (see
Graph 2). For grape farms with a grape price ranging from
€200 to €500/hl (i.e. approximately 18% of French farms
specialized in grape growing), there is an increasing labor
proﬁtability trend which is nevertheless relative, ranging from
10% in the ﬁrst (o7.47 ha) and the last quartile (420.8 ha).
Whenever the price is lower than €200/hl, the variations in
labor proﬁtability are more signiﬁcant and almost regular:
between the ﬁrst and the fourth quartile, it increases by about
50% for the grape farms selling wines at a price below €75/hl
(35% of French farms specialized in viticulture) and it almost
doubles for grape farms selling wine at an average price
ranging from €75 to €200/hl (24% of French grape farms
specialized in viticulture). Likewise, in this case, it is the
Graph 3. - Proﬁtability by wine price classes and increasing size of the quartiles of vineyard, not including Poitou-Charentes.
Source: FADN-France, constant sample 2005–2007 – authors' computation
B. Delord et al. / Wine Economics and Policy 4 (2015) 22–34 29increase in the physical productivity of labor (i.e. the number
of hectares of vines per unit of labor) that is the main factor
underlying the variations.
6.2. Price and yield
The grape farms with a price below €75/hl are quite
heterogeneous: a proportion of these farms (i.e. about 1/5)
are located in the Poitou-Charentes region where the
production of PDO Cognac (distilled from wine) is predomi-
nant. By taking account of the special conditions of this
production, and in particular the relatively high yields, the
proﬁtability of these farms is very high. We do not need to
treat farms producing Champagne in the same way (they also
have very high yields) as they are sufﬁciently isolated in the
category, representing a price of more than €1000/hl price.
In the Poitou-Charentes region, the wine produced is a raw
material for producing PDO brandy Cognac, with very high
yields but with very low price, so the whole income still is
high. That is the reason we added the result excluding that
really atypical vineyard. It modiﬁes signiﬁcantly the relation-
ship between size and income. It changes the slope of the line.
So, if we exclude the grape farms in the Poitou-Charentes
region, the proﬁtability of selling at less than €75/hl is
signiﬁcantly lower and, most importantly, ﬂuctuates erratically
according to the surface area and always remains inferior to
half of the minimum wage (see Graph 3).
We should notice that, in the case of grape farms selling
wine at low prices (o€/hl75 and €/hl 75–200), the level of
proﬁtability is low. Even in the case of large farms (i.e. farms
included in the last quartile, owning more than 26 or 27 ha of
vines), the value does not exceed €28,000 per worker; it
reaches €23,400 when the selling price is lower than €75/hl;
even if we exclude grape farms from the Poitou-Charente
region, the maximum values would reach €25,600 and €15,400
respectively (see Graphs 2 and 3).
Among those farms obtaining less than €200/hl, such a level
of proﬁtability is not sufﬁcient to pay for labor according to the
minimum legal labor rules: the minimum wage (SMIC inFrench) is about €20,000/year for this period, when the cost of
social protection is included. After incorporating taxes, the
payment of interest on debts and land rental (fermages), the
revenue per unit of labor never reaches the minimum wage
level. For prices ranging from €75 to €200/hl, revenue
increases considerably (almost doubling) between the ﬁrst
and fourth quartiles; however, if we exclude the Poitou-
Charentes region, it remains below the minimum wage.
This minimum income level can only be reached in the
case of average selling prices ranging from €200 to €500/hl.
Even then, it only slightly exceeds the minimal wage in the
same way (i.e. approximately 10 percent), independently of the
quartile considered.6.3. A synthetic overview
Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) is a method that
allows studying the association between three or more
qualitative variables. One can obtain maps where it is possible
to visually observe the positioning between the categories of
the qualitative variables size of the vineyard, physical pro-
ductivity (surface per unit of labor), yield (volume of grapes
harvested per unit of surface area), average selling price and
proﬁtability (net value added per unit of labor). The observa-
tions (farms) are not displayed on the map but so are the
regions as supplementary variables. These variables were not
included ex-ante to determine the values of the axis and we
therefore simply added these supplementary variables to the
axis afterwards. Interpretation of category points is guided by
the centroid principle: category coordinates are the weighted
average of variable coordinates occurring in that category.
Unlike many other data analysis, this method needs no hypoth-
esis about the links between variables, i.e. it does not use a
formalized theoretical model a priori deﬁned; so it is part of the
non-parametric methods of data analysis. The axes present in
the chart have an algebraic precise deﬁnition but their
economic interpretation is very complex. The most noteworthy





PLoir = Pays de Loire
PACAc = Provence- Alpes-Côte 
d’Azur et Corse
Graph 4. - Multiple correspondence analysis. Size of the vineyard: Green. Physical productivity (surface per unit of labor): Blue. Yield (volume of grapes harvested
per unit of surface area): Black. Average selling price: Orange. Proﬁtability (net value added per unit of labor): Red. .
Source: FADN-France, constant sample 2005–2007 – authors processing
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multiple correspondence analysis introducing the variable line
plot (Hoffman and de Leeuw, 1992). The line plot illustrates
the spread of the category points for each variable. A variable
discriminates better to the extent that its category points are
further apart. The line plot thus show how well each variable
discriminates, as visualized by the sum of the squared
distances between the category points for a variable and the
origin. Furthermore the points (categories or classes) of the
same variable are naturally ordered (from largest to smallest),
which makes possible and interesting to consider the lines, their
shape and their orientation. Oriented curves (in color) drawn on the
graph aim to facilitate the observation of the factors correlated each
other and noteworthy with differences in income. The points of the
categories of the other variables which approach a random
distribution or more accurately the average distribution observed
in the population are placed near the center of the axes.
For example, by paying careful attention to the Graph 4, we
can observe in its upper right part the proximity of, a high
price of wine (€ 1,000/hl), a high income (4¼60 K €/awu), a
small area per worker (o2 ha / awu), a small vineyard
(o5 ha) and the region Champagne. All these features are
well known for that region, its wines and producers.
In the ﬁrst 2 axes – among 23 possibilities – there is an
overall contribution of 24% to total inertia (see Table 2 in the
Appendix C). Of the 27 modalities of the variables, 18 have
one correlation (squared-cosine) greater than 0.1, of which 12
are greater than 0.2. Graph 4 introduces a ‘scaphoid’ (here a
horizontal ‘U shaped’ curve).
If we consider typology, the modalities of the 5 variables are
represented in the scaphoid in a logical order. However, their
signiﬁcation is not the same: proﬁtability (red in the graph)
and wine price (orange) go in one direction (‘upstream’), while
the representation of the surface areas (green) and physicalproductivity (blue, measured as hectares per annual work unit)
go in another direction (‘downstream’).
The yield (measured as quintals of grapes per hectare –
black), whose modes are put together near the center of
gravity, is independent of this order except at the point where
the higher yields (4100 q/ha) are located in an area of high
proﬁtability and high prices, i.e. close to the Champagne area.
We therefore notice the very speciﬁc position of Poitou-
Charentes in the graph, located between proﬁtability and high
yields (Champagne) and the low prices with high physical
productivity (surface per labor unit) typical of Languedoc-
Roussillon. This representation therefore conﬁrms that it is
necessary to study each region individually.
As in the entire TF, physical labor productivity (i.e. the number
of hectares per worker) seems to be relatively dependent on farm
size. However, in the case of the TF specialized in grape growing,
physical productivity does not provide a signiﬁcant explanation of
the differences in productivity and the differences in income; it
provides a contrasting explanation to what we would expect. The
key factor, which is positively related to proﬁtability and revenues,
is the price of wine.
Our results therefore show that the proﬁtability of farms is
rarely higher in large-scale farms than in smaller ones. This
association is only true when the price of wine is low. In the
case of a particular zone (Cognac), the increase in proﬁtability
for large farms holds, but when the proﬁtability of small farms
is already signiﬁcant. For the remaining regions of France and
for low prices, the increase in proﬁtability is high in terms of
relative value but modest in terms of absolute value: the
proﬁtability levels reached by large farms are too low to allow
the average revenue per unit of labor to reach the minimal legal
wage in France. Accordingly, it does not seem feasible for the
abolition of vine planting rights in France to impact all the
categories of ‘sizes’ and ‘prices’. Consequently, it would not
Graph 5. – Average vineyard surface area by farm cultivating vines (ha). .
Source: Eurostat – authors processing
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extension, to an improvement in grape growers' incomes.
In short, the wine policy would not be effective.
7. Concentration of European wine production
There is another way in which to examine the potential impact
of canceling vine planting rights on grape production: we should
look at the evolution of the production structures over time.
One of the arguments put forward by experts supporting the
suppression of vine planting rights states that vine planting
rights would ‘freeze’ the production structures, preventing the
expansion of farms in Europe and therefore hindering the
improved proﬁtability associated with the expansion of vine-
yard surface areas.
7.1. The progressive growth of Farms
Eurostat data shows that, among the oldest member states of
the EU, domestic vineyard surface areas decreased over the
past two decades (1990–2007) by factors ranging from 35% in
Portugal to between 10% and 20% in Italy and France and a
little less than 10% in Greece, Spain and Germany.
At the same time, a considerable number of farms producing
grapes disappeared entirely, or at least the farms no longer
produce grapes. One of the direct consequences of the decrease
in surface areas is that the average size of farms has increased
considerably (see Graph 5). In France, Germany, Italy and
Spain, the average size of farms in the viticulture segment
almost doubled during this period.
7.2. On the evolution of regional vineyards
Consequently, while national vineyard surface areas
decreased over the past two decades (and the same phenom-
enon was observed in many regions), we nevertheless note thatin some regions, vineyard surface areas actually increased:
þ40% in Extremadura,þ20% in Burgundy, Alsace and
Champagne-Ardennes and þ5% in Catalonia, Rioja, Castilla-
y-Leon, Aquitaine, Baden-Württemberg and Friuli-Venezia-
Giulia. Finally, we can also note that these ‘evolutions’ in
the vineyards as well as the in every European country do not
generally beneﬁt the regions that a priori enjoy more favorable
conditions for planting and developing vines.
In short, the persistence of a vine planting rights system in
Europe appears to be compatible with vigorous growth of farm
sizes while also facilitating the transfer of vine surface areas
between regions, at least over the past two decades.8. Concluding remarks
This work has established that from a theoretical point of view
the net value added per worker is a good estimator for economies
of scale. Further, the use of this estimator is quite interesting as it is
almost impossible to measure economies of scale directly (i.e. a
decrease of average cost when the farm size increases) in
agriculture due to the non-ﬁxity of the cost of family labor.
Furthermore, this work demonstrates – at least for the
French case – that the performances of farms growing grapes
are only slightly inﬂuenced by their size. Differences in
proﬁtability between farms are based on differences in the
selling price of wine. These differences are related to the
location and the designation of origin (PDO wines), i.e.
inﬂuenced by the control of the supply and its potential, the
surface areas and the means used to manage vine planting
rights in every country, region or PDO.
The levels of proﬁtability reached by large farms do not avoid
low incomes, at least if we take account of the legal minimal wage.
We noted that, despite the existence of regulations govern-
ing vine planting rights, European farm holdings recently
enjoyed a period of considerable growth with regard to average
size as well as demonstrating a change in geographic location.
B. Delord et al. / Wine Economics and Policy 4 (2015) 22–3432Furthermore, and in order to ﬁnd a solution to this problem,
ceteris paribus, it is possible to expect that an increase in vine
plantings will lead to market imbalances (plethora). This
would lead to a negative impact on prices and therefore on
the proﬁtability of farms. (Montaigne, 1997). Consequently,
further public intervention would be required to regulate the
markets and maintain grape growers' income. In times of
constraint and even reduction of the EU budget devoted to
agriculture, interventions will be limited to what has been
accepted by the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) and the reform of the wine CMO, so interventions
chosen from the menu and this differentially across countries.Today, the use of distillation is not possible except using the
national budget and for localized action; the use of crop
insurance cannot operate to cover this systemic risk. Finally,
we can think of a wider use of direct aid, for now excluded in
France, and the strengthening of marketing aid for exporting in
the non-European countries.
Another important point to be stressed is the need to ﬁnd a
balance in the markets, but this debate goes beyond the
abolition of regulations governing production and trade. In
summary, it would be necessary to take into account the
organization of the value chains, the sharing of value-added
and the means required to access the land markets.Appendix A
Sources, methods and deﬁnitions
FADN: is an annual European survey focusing on the economic data of farm holdings. Depending on the European
Commission, the constraints for accessing the database are signiﬁcant. In this study, we focus on the French FADN for the
period covering 2005–2007. From 2008, access to the database became more complex. In order to improve the reliability of the
results, we used average data for the three-year period (2005–2007) concerning the variables related to the farm holdings using
a ‘constant sample’ i.e. using the same farm holdings available across all three years.
Eurostat: Eurostat provides results from agricultural censuses and surveys relating to the structures of agricultural farm
holdings. Data is available for every country of the EU-28.
Net Value Added: it includes ‘value added’ (salesþstock variationsþ residual productþsubsidies – intermediary consumptions)
less depreciation; it is included as a proportion of annual labor. ‘Net value added’ is a good indicator of labor proﬁtability in
agricultural farm holdings.
SGM (Standard Gross Margin): this is a measure of the economic dimension of farm holdings. The regional SGM coefﬁcient of
a crop or livestock item is deﬁned as the value of output from one hectare or from one animal less the cost of the variable inputs
required to produce that output.
Types of Farming (TF): this characterizes the orientation of production at farm level according to the contribution of each crop
or animal to the total SGM of the farm retained. For farms specialized in viticulture, there are 2 main types of farming (TF) in




Division into quartiles according to the number of farms after extrapolation (number of farms represented below) ranked
according to the surface planted with vines for each one of the ﬁve categories of wine sales.
The upper limits established in hectares of vines for each quartile are deﬁned below:Wine price (in €/hl) Upper limit (in ha) of vineyard surface forFirst quartile Second quartile Third quartile0–75 13.00 17.58 25.69
75–200 9.58 16.77 26.97
200–500 7.47 11.86 20.84
500–1,000 1.90 2.88 7.24
4¼1,000 2.59 4.49 6.62
all farms without price categories 6.94 12.61 21.60
B. Delord et al. / Wine Economics and Policy 4 (2015) 22–34 33For graph 3:Wine price (in €/hl) Upper limit (in ha) of vineyard surface forFirst quartile Second quartile Third quartile0–75 12.61 17.58 25.919
75–200 9.58 16.61 26.61
200–500 7.47 11.86 20.84
500–1,000 1.90 2.88 7.24
4¼1,000 2.59 4.49 6.62
all farms without price categories 6.50 11.86 20.19Appendix C. Table 2 – Axis describing the Multiple Correspondence analysisThe CORRESP Procedure
Decomposition of o inertia and Khi 2Value singul. Inertia main Khi 2 Percentage Percent cumulative 3 6 9 12 15
——þ ——þ ——þ ——þ ——þ0.82466 0.68006 211326 14.78 14.78 nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn
0.64686 0.41843 130024 9.10 23.88 nnnnnnnnnnnnnnn
0.55573 0.30884 95970 6.71 30.59 nnnnnnnnnnn
0.53044 0.28137 87434 6.12 36.71 nnnnnnnnnn
0.51529 0.26553 82511 5.77 42.48 nnnnnnnnnn
0.48963 0.23974 74497 5.21 47.69 nnnnnnnnn
0.47375 0.22444 69743 4.88 52.57 nnnnnnnn
0.46906 0.22002 68370 4.78 57.36 nnnnnnnn
0.46327 0.21462 66692 4.67 62.02 nnnnnnnn
0.44891 0.20152 62620 4.38 66.40 nnnnnnn
0.44199 0.19536 60707 4.25 70.65 nnnnnnn
0.43855 0.19232 59763 4.18 74.83 nnnnnnn
0.41126 0.16914 52558 3.68 78.51 nnnnnn
0.40127 0.16102 50036 3.50 82.01 nnnnnn
0.38569 0.14876 46225 3.23 85.24 nnnnn
0.37896 0.14361 44625 3.12 88.36 nnnnn
0.35417 0.12544 38978 2.73 91.09 nnnnn
0.33889 0.11485 35688 2.50 93.59 nnnn
0.31778 0.10099 31381 2.20 95.78 nnnn
0.27492 0.07558 23487 1.64 97.43 nnn
0.24776 0.06138 19074 1.33 98.76 nn
0.20453 0.04183 12999 0.91 99.67 nn
0.12314 0.01516 4712 0.33 100.00 n
Total 4.60000 1429423 100.00Source: FADN-France, constant sample 2005–2007 – authors' computation.References
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